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INTRODUCTION
As part of the process of readmitting the former Confederate
states to representation in Congress, that body enacted statutes
requiring certain political protections of the freed slaves. The
Military Reconstruction Act and its amendments and implementing
statutes-referred to as the "Reconstruction Acts" '-required the
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University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. LL.M., Yale Law School; J.D.,
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1. The basic framework was established by Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428,
amended by Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2, amended by Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30,
15 Stat. 14, amended by Act of Mar. 11, 1868, 15 Stat. 41. See also 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 182
(1867), available at 1867 WL 2127 (addressing the powers and duties of military
commanders under the Reconstruction Acts); 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 141 (1867), available at
1867 WL 2123 (outlining voter qualification and registration requirements under the
Reconstruction Acts). Congress then declared, in a series of acts, that particular states
had satisfied the requirements established in the earlier laws. See Act of June 22, 1868, ch.
69, 15 Stat. 72, 73 (readmitting Arkansas); Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73, 73-74
(readmitting, subject to their ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and conditioned
upon their continued compliance in refraining from withdrawing the right to vote from
any citizen or class thereof, North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia,
Alabama, and Florida); Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 17, 16 Stat. 40, 41 (authorizing referenda
on new constitutions in Mississippi, Texas and Virginia); Act of Dec. 22, 1869, ch. 3, 16
Stat. 59, 60 (addressing reconstruction of Georgia); Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 299, 16 Stat.
363, 363--64 (declaring that Georgia had complied with all conditions and was therefore
entitled to representation in Congress); Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 62-63,
amended by Act of Feb. 1, 1870, ch. 12, 16 Stat. 63 (declaring Virginia's compliance and
readmission to representation in Congress); Act of Feb. 23, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 67-68
(readmitting Mississippi); Act of Mar. 30, 1870, 16 Stat. 80, 80-81 (readmitting Texas).
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Southern states2 to grant broad and race-neutral access to the ballot.3
The Reconstruction Acts were highly effective in enfranchising
African-Americans as the victorious U.S. Army directly enforced
them during its occupation of the former Confederacy. Because the
troops would not be there forever, Congress agreed to seat Southern
delegates only on the "fundamental condition" that they include
suffrage provisions, which could never be narrowed, in their
constitutions.4 All of the states adopted such provisions, and their
terms were approved by Congress.'
The Reconstruction Acts had a much greater impact on African-
American suffrage in the South than the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments, at least until the end of Reconstruction and arguably
until the Second Reconstruction6 in the 1950s and 1960s; for a while,
they worked.' They failed to prevent the political, cultural, and
economic tragedy of Jim Crow, however, because the fundamental
condition-unalterable suffrage requirements-was not honored.
The suffrage provisions of the constitutions created under the
Reconstruction Acts-indeed, in most of the South, the entire
constitutions-were superseded by now notorious tests and devices
designed to disenfranchise African-Americans: poll taxes, literacy
2. The Reconstruction Act did not affect Tennessee, however, which was statutorily
exempted from Military Reconstruction. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428,
428-29 (omitting Tennessee from the list of rebel states).
3. The states were also required to ratify the pending Reconstruction Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. at 429 (requiring states
to ratify Fourteenth Amendment); Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. at 62 (noting that
Virginia had ratified the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
4. The readmission acts for Virginia, Texas and Mississippi also provided that the
state constitution "shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class
of citizens of the United States of the school rights and privileges secured by the
constitution of said State." 16 Stat. at 63 (Virginia); 16 Stat. at 68 (Mississippi); 16 Stat. at
81 (Texas). See A-1 By D-2 v. Molpus, 906 F. Supp. 375, 378-79 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (holding
that an educational right claim based on a readmission act was barred by the statute of
limitations).
5. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
6. The post-World War II civil rights movement is often referred to as the "Second
Reconstruction." See, e.g., J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY
VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999);
MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1990 (2d ed. 1991).
7. Military Reconstruction "enfranchise[d] approximately one million blacks." JOHN
HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 79 (2d ed. 1994). By
contrast, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were, for a period, so
comprehensively ineffective that there were calls for their repeal. See Nicholas Murray
Butler, The New American Revolution, 10 A.B.A. J. 845, 848 (1924); John R. Dos Passos,
The Negro Question, 12 YALE L.J. 467,480 (1903).
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tests, and grandfather clauses.'
The new constitutions were created in ways that raise eyebrows.
In some cases, the amendment provisions of the state's existing
constitution were ignored. 9 The Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Louisiana constitutions were simply promulgated by the
constitutional conventions that drafted them without being put to a
vote of the people. This was because the drafting conventions "were
convened primarily for the purpose of disfranchising the colored
voters, and submission of their constitutions to the people might well
have placed in peril the principal object which they had in view."' 0 In
all cases, "the Negro was all but completely excluded from the
conventions called to consider his disfranchisement."'" The broad
effect of the new constitutions was to reject the principles of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments-lest anyone
overlook the point, some states eliminated existing constitutional
prohibitions on slavery, secession, or both.l" The particular method
was to implement white supremacy by repudiating the fundamental
condition of the Reconstruction Acts.
The broad voting rights protected by the fundamental condition
apparently were never judicially enforced. 3  The "redeemed"' 4
8. See V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 531-54 (1949)
(describing post-Reconstruction disenfranchisement).
9. See, e.g., CHARLES SUMNER LOBINGIER, THE PEOPLE'S LAW OR POPULAR
PARTICIPATION IN LAWMAKING 302 (photo. reprint 2001) (1909) (discussing the
Mississippi Constitution).
10. WALTER F. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 67 (photo. reprint 1970) (1910); see also id. at 68 (noting that the Virginia
constitutional convention "did not submit its constitution to the people, largely, it would
seem, for fear of its being defeated by the elements to be disfranchised.").
11. C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913, at 337 (1971).
12. JAMES Q. DEALEY, GROWTH OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 92-95
(photo. reprint 1972) (1915) (discussing the abandonment of various reconstruction-
imposed constitutional provisions in the newly framed South Carolina, Alabama, and
Virginia state constitutions).
13. Several cases allude to voting claims under the Reconstruction Acts which were
left unresolved. See, e.g., Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614, 616 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984)
(acknowledging Readmission Act claim regarding disenfranchisement of certain convicted
criminals but granting relief on other grounds), affd, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Allen v. Ellisor,
664 F.2d 391, 405 n.6 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Winter, J., concurring and dissenting)
(recognizing Reconstruction Act claim in the disqualification of criminals from voting),
vacated for consideration of mootness, 454 U.S. 807 (1981); Brickhouse v. Brooks, 165 F.
534, 546 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1908) (holding a claim challenging the validity of a voter
registration ordinance to be a non-justiciable political question); State v. Franklin, 60 S.E.
953, 954 (S.C. 1908) (stating that a claim regarding suffrage provision of the readmission
act "would be wholly inapplicable to our constitutional provisions in regard to juries"),
affd sub nom., Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161, 166 (1910) ("If it could be held
that the act of Congress restricted the state of South Carolina in fixing the qualifications
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southern governments were unenthusiastic about Reconstruction in
general. 5 The Mississippi Supreme Court noted that the Mississippi
Constitution of 1890 violated the Act but concluded that the Act itself
was unconstitutional because "[t]he regulation of the right of suffrage
belongs to the state," subject only to the Fifteenth Amendment's
"prohibition of discrimination against persons on account of race or
color.' 1 6 The Arkansas Supreme Court likewise rejected a challenge
to a felon disenfranchisement statute on the same basis.'
7
for suffrage, it is unnecessary to decide the point in this case."). Of course, non-
enforcement does not affect the efficacy of an otherwise valid federal statute. See District
of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 113-14 (1953) (finding enforceable
Reconstruction-era public accommodations statute applicable to the District of
Columbia).
14. As recalcitrant white southerners reassumed political power in the waning days of
Reconstruction, they began to "identify[] their cause with the mission of Jesus Christ-to
the world, they announced themselves proudly as the South's 'redeemers.' " Edward A.
Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race,
History, and "Federal Courts", 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927,1982 (2003).
15. See, e.g., Bourland v. Pollock, 249 S.W. 360, 363 (Ark. 1923) ("The Constitution of
1874 was framed... as the organic law of the state of Arkansas by representatives chosen
by the people just after they had been disenthralled from a government which had been
foisted upon them ... during the period known as the Reconstruction Era"); Whitlock v.
Hawkins, 53 S.E. 401, 405 (Va. 1906) ("The reconstruction acts were a flagrant violation of
the Constitution, and the whole system which rested upon them was an usurpation ... ");
Grigsby v. Peak, 57 Tex. 142, 150 (1882), available at 1882 WL 9476, at *7 (holding statute
of limitations suspended during and after the Civil War on grounds that "government by a
military dictator ... caused [the state's] whole judicial system to be greatly demoralized
and impaired"); see also Davis v. Allison, 211 S.W. 980, 982 (Tex. 1919) (referring to "the
alien Legislatures of the Reconstruction period"); cf Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 272
(Utah 1968) (stating that Southern states' ratifications of the Fourteenth Amendment
were accomplished by "spurious, nonrepresentative governments").
16. Sproule v. Fredericks, 11 So. 472, 474-75 (Miss. 1892). An important case
following Sproule is Butler v, Thompson, 97 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Va.) (three judge court),
affd mem. per curiam, 341 U.S. 937 (1951), overruled in part by Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). In Butler, the district court rejected a challenge to a poll
tax on several grounds, including that Congress had "no power in admitting a state to
impose [a] restriction which would operate to deprive that state of equality with other
states." 97 F. Supp. at 21. Although the Supreme Court affirmed this case without
opinion, suggesting that this claim may have been correct, the affirmance was itself
overruled, leaving the import of the District Court opinion somewhat murky.
17. See Merritt v. Jones, 533 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Ark. 1976). The Arkansas Supreme
Court explained why the readmission act's suffrage provision was unconstitutional:
First, we must consider that this Act was in 1868, soon after the Civil War, and it
was designed and intended to prevent unconstitutional criminal laws as a means
of depriving former slaves of the right to vote. That is no longer a consideration.
The Act purports to state the conditions upon which the State of Arkansas would
be readmitted to the Union and be entitled to representation in Congress, but the
Supreme Court has ruled that the Confederate states were never out of the
Union and, hence, there was no necessity for readmission. Even if we assume
that the Act has some force and effect, its enforcement is in the exclusive domain
of Congress. Such was the determination when identical language was
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Commentators have also doubted the constitutional validity of such
acts:
Congress may dictate terms to territorial governments, and to
provisional governments in states, and place upon them
conditions, or insist on "irrevocable compacts," but once the
state becomes a full fledged member of the Union, such
conditions and compacts may remain as moral obligations but
would hardly be enforcible [sic] at law.
1 8
Yet much may be said in defense of the Reconstruction Acts and
the fundamental condition. 9 First, by defining a class of persons who
were per se eligible to vote, it anticipated Southern
disenfranchisement techniques.20 Poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and
literacy tests were invalidated with investigation, factfinding,
litigation, and legislation over the course of decades." It was not until
considered in an act concerning the State of Virginia's constitutional poll tax
requirement.
Id. (citing Butler, 97 F. Supp. at 17) (citations omitted).
18. DEALEY, supra note 12, at 70; see also Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism,
and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881,
1923 (1995) (observing that, prior to the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, "[wlith
most of the former Confederate states already readmitted to the Union, Southern black
suffrage was now secured only by a combination of repealable state law, congressional
readmission conditions widely thought to be unconstitutional, and.. . Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment" (citing EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION
AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 138-40 (1990))).
19. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
20. Indeed, prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights proposed a voting provision substantially identical to the
fundamental condition. See REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS '63, at 28
(1963). The Commission recommended that Congress:
[E]nact legislation providing that all citizens of the United States shall have a
right to vote in Federal or State elections which shall not be denied or in any way
abridged or interfered with by the United States or by any State for any cause
except for inability to meet reasonable age or length-of-residence requirements
uniformly applied to all persons within a State, failure to complete six grades of
formal education or its equivalent, legal confinement at the time of registration
or election, judicially determined mental disability, or conviction of a felony; such
right to vote to include the right to register or otherwise qualify to vote, and to
have one's vote counted.
Id.
21. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (invalidating poll
taxes); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965) (invalidating interpretation
test); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960) (holding that racial gerrymandering
violates the Fifteenth Amendment); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 365 (1915)
(invalidating grandfather clause). For examples of the U.S. Supreme Court's factfinding
regarding race-based disenfranchisement, see generally South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966) (describing disenfranchisement of African Americans while upholding
Voting Rights Act of 1965), and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (describing
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the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that the legal status of African-
American suffrage in the South reached the condition that Congress
had first decreed in 1867.
The Reconstruction Acts also anticipated, with substantial
accuracy, the scope of the modern right to vote.22 The Acts did not
permit denial of the franchise based on failure to possess sufficient
property, nonpayment of a poll tax,23 or flunking a literacy test,24 but
did permit establishment of residency requirements 25 and the
disenfranchisement of some felons.26 Perhaps this congruence should
not be surprising given that the Reconstruction Acts and the
Fourteenth Amendment, the source of most voting rights
27jurisprudence, were both drafted by the 39th Congress.
Congress might also be credited with prescience (or at least
sound judgment) about the importance of African-American suffrage
to long term stability in the South. Without the vote, as it turned out,
African-Americans were the subject of hostile legislation and
discriminatory enforcement. The discriminatory treatment of
African-Americans led to many negative consequences for the federal
government, from the necessity to send federal troops to keep order
(or suffer disorder),28 to the compromise of American military and
diplomatic goals because of bad international publicity,29 to the
disenfranchisement of African Americans in Texas).
22. While the Reconstruction Acts accurately described the contours of the modern
right to vote, they did not anticipate the expansion of that right by subsequent
constitutional amendments. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (granting women the right to
vote); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (lowering the voting age to eighteen years).
23. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 (invalidating poll taxes).
24. Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959),
upheld the literacy test against an equal protection challenge, but the Voting Rights Act of
1965 suspended the literacy test, and it has been a dead letter since. See Voting Rights Act
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (1965) (eliminating voting requirements
that "deny[] or abridge[]" the right to vote "on account of race or color").
25. Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973) (per curiam) (upholding a fifty-day
registration requirement).
26. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
27. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, 428-30 (enacting the Military
Reconstruction Act); J. Res. 48, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 Stat. 358, 358-59 (1866)
(proposing what would later become the Fourteenth Amendment).
28. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL
VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH 70-105 (1987)
(discussing President Kennedy's use, and threatened use, of federal troops to suppress
segregationist violence in the South); GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT THERE WAS NO PEACE:
THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 108 (1984) (discussing
federal troops being assigned to guard Reconstruction-era polling stations "to prevent the
outcome from being decided by shotguns").
29. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 61, 62 (1988) (observing that "[a]t a time when the U.S. hoped to reshape the
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inadequate medical and educational condition of African-Americans
in the South called to military service.3" Had the Reconstruction
Acts' fundamental condition been honored, it is much more likely
that the relations between the races in the South would have been
worked out without these enormous costs in lives and property.
This Essay proposes that the Reconstruction Acts' restriction on
the power of the former Confederate states to deny the right to vote
was constitutional. Part I briefly describes the legal events following
the Northern victory, focusing on the Military Reconstruction Act
and its progeny.3  Courts and commentators doubting the
constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts often rely on the doctrine
of equality of states, reasoning that the Acts imposed special
restrictions on the former Confederate states which were inapplicable
to others. Part II explains that the equality of states principle is
inapplicable to Reconstruction because it invalidates only conditions
or restrictions that are beyond the authority of Congress.32
As befits one of the most important, costly, and complicated
events in American history, the Civil War implicated many provisions
of the Constitution.33 Perhaps the Reconstruction Acts could be
justified as an exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.34 However, given that the
postwar world in its own image, the international attention given to racial segregation was
troublesome and embarrassing").
30. See GEORGE Q. FLYNN, THE DRAFT 1940-1973, at 207 (1993) ("American society
ensured that black fell out of the draft pool by failing to meet physical and mental
standards, a trend from the beginning of conscription.").
31. See infra notes 43-80 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
33. For discussion of some of the constitutional issues that arose from the Civil War,
see generally HERMAN BELZ, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND EQUAL
RIGHTS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1998) (discussing, inter alia, the Civil War
Amendments' effects on constitutional issues such as individual liberty and federalism);
DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN's CONSTITUTION 1 (2003) (stating that the Civil War "raised
questions about state sovereignty versus national power, executive authority versus
congressional prerogatives, and individual rights versus national security."); David P.
Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil War And Reconstruction, 1865-1873,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 131 (1984) (discussing various strands of Supreme Court jurisprudence
originating out of Civil War disputes over military trials, loyalty oaths, federal courts'
jurisdiction, the illegality of secession, and the validity of paper currency); Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction's
Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002) (addressing the political pressures faced by the
Supreme Court during Reconstruction and analyzing how politics can both threaten and
protect the Court's institutional role).
34. Specifically, the courts invalidated the poll tax, the white primary, the grandfather
clause, racial gerrymandering, and discriminatory application of any voting requirement
based on self-executing provisions of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. See cases
cited supra note 21. The Voting Rights Act eliminated the literacy test, see 42 U.S.C.
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Reconstruction Acts both preexisted and caused the ratification of
those amendments," even if technically plausible, the argument that
the Reconstruction Acts led to the Amendments and the
Amendments in turn legitimate the Reconstruction Acts involves too
much bootstrapping for comfort if there is another ground for
sustaining the Acts.
Primarily relying on the Reconstruction-era decisions of the
Supreme Court, Part III proposes that a number of provisions of the
then-existing U.S. Constitution authorized federal intervention. The
critical preliminary step in evaluating the constitutionality of federal
measures is the legal principle that in a civil war "hostilities may be
prosecuted on the same footing as if those opposing the Government
were foreign enemies invading the land."36  Accordingly, the
Reconstruction Acts must be tested not only as an exercise of the
power to repel invasion and suppress insurrection,37 and the
obligation to guarantee a republican form of government,38 but also as
an exercise of the war power,39 perhaps the greatest power possessed
by the national government. Based on the Supreme Court's
understanding of the scope of these powers, the Reconstruction Acts
are comfortably within the authority of Congress.4 °
Part III goes on to argue that in spite of the protection of the
franchise under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 1 enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts would affect
the scope of the right to vote in the former Confederate states in two
ways. First, the Reconstruction Acts make clear that
disenfranchisement is punishment, which requires that it be applied in
1973b (2000), and the Court held that Congress had authority to do so. See Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646-47 (1966). Therefore, every effect that the Reconstruction Act
would have had on the disenfranchisement schemes of the former Confederate states was
either required by the Constitution itself or permitted as a means of enforcing it.
35. Recall that the Reconstruction Acts required the Southern states to ratify the
Reconstruction Amendments as a condition of readmission to representation in Congress.
See supra note 3.
36. The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635,667-68 (1862).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (providing that Congress shall have the power to
"provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions").
38. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1 (guaranteeing, inter alia, that "the United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government").
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (providing that Congress shall have the power to
"declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures
on Land and Water").
40. See infra notes 93-149 and accompanying text.
41. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)).
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accordance with the criminal protections in the Bill of Rights.
Second, the Reconstruction Acts limit disenfranchisement to certain
serious crimes. Thus, they undermine the political utility of altering
the criminal code to criminalize conduct thought to be
disproportionately committed by African-Americans. They also
eliminate the need for inquiries into the legislative motivation for, or
selective enforcement of, criminal and election laws.42
I. MILITARY RECONSTRUCTION
The relationship between the United States and the former
Confederate states had to be repaired following the Civil War. A
critical problem was Southern representation in Congress. The
Southern delegation had resigned before the War, and there were no
incumbent officeholders in 1865." Given that the Southern states had
made war on the United States, it was far from obvious that
representatives from the insurrectionist states should be readmitted
immediately and unconditionally.
The issue of congressional representation was compounded by
the changed political status of African-Americans. The
Emancipation Proclamation declared the slaves in the South free on
January 1, 1863, and the Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery on a
national basis.' Several political problems were created by
emancipation. First, Article I, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution discounted slaves for purposes of apportionment of
representation in the House, counting each one as three-fifths of a
person.45 After the Thirteenth Amendment, there were no slaves;
therefore, the African-American population of the South would no
42. See infra notes 150-61 and accompanying text.
43. Senator John Carlile and Representative Charles Upton, Unionists from Virginia,
were the only representatives from the Confederate states to appear for the organization
of the 37th Congress in December, 1861. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 1-2
(1861); see also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4 (1863) (showing no
representatives from Confederate states in House at organization of 38th Congress; only
Unionists Carlile and Lemuel Bowden in the Senate from Virginia). After the War,
Congress was also devoid of representatives from the former Confederate states. See
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1865) (showing that only Senators and
Representatives from loyal states were seated); see also J. Res. 58, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 15
Stat. 257, 257-59 (providing that rebel states would not be entitled to representation in the
electoral college, unless "such State shall have ... become entitled to representation in
Congress, pursuant to the Acts of Congress in that behalf").
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States . .
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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longer be undercounted by two-fifths, thereby raising the number of
congressional representatives and presidential electors apportioned to
the South.
Moreover, the inclination of the white population of the South to
subordinate African-Americans did not suddenly dissipate with Lee's
surrender. The Southern states emphatically rejected the Fourteenth
Amendment when it was proposed, and enacted a series of "Black
Codes" circumscribing the rights and status of African-Americans.
46
Accordingly, Congress and the North had to either accept permanent
suppression of a now-free people in the South, continue the armed
conflict indefinitely by occupying the South to protect free African-
Americans, or find an alternative method of preventing a return to
the institutionalized racism of the antebellum South.
It is against this backdrop that Congress began to legislate with
respect to the future of the former Confederate states. In March of
1867, Congress passed the Military Reconstruction Act,47 which
provided the basic framework for normalization of relations. The Act
divided the South into military districts under military command.48 A
state could get out from under this regime and regain its right to have
delegates seated in Congress by (1) ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment, (2) holding a constitutional convention, (3) adopting a
new constitution consistent with the federal Constitution, and (4)
having the new constitution approved by Congress.49
The Act established suffrage requirements applicable to the
election of delegates to the constitutional convention, the referendum
to approve the constitution produced by the convention, and elections
held under the new constitution. Those entitled to vote included
"male citizens of said State, twenty-one years old and upward, of
whatever race, color or previous condition of servitude ... except
such as may be disenfranchised for participation in the rebellion or
for felony at common law."5
All Southern states complied with the Act's requirements,
adopting new constitutions with broad suffrage.5 For example,
46. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863-1877, at 199-201 (1988).
47. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 163, 14 Stat. 428.
48. Id. §§ 1-3.
49. Id. § 5.
50. Id.
51. See generally SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
(William F. Swindler ed., 1973) [hereinafter SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS] (compiling full texts of modern and historical constitutions of
the states).
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Alabama enfranchised "[e]very male person, born in the United
States, and every male person who has been naturalized, or who has
legally declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States,
twenty-one years old or upward." 2 The constitutions of other states
were similar. 3 The states also ratified the constitutional amendments
as required by the Act.54
Singly and in groups, the rebel states were readmitted to
representation in Congress. All of the acts restoring their
representation in Congress included the "fundamental condition"
that
the state constitution shall never be so amended or changed as
to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States
who are entitled to vote by the constitution herein recognized,
except as a punishment for such crimes as are now felonies at
common law, whereof they shall have been duly convicted,
under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said
State: Provided, that any alteration of said constitution
prospective in its effect may be made in regard to the time and
place of residence of voters.55
Military government ended when the state constitutions were
approved and civilian governments were restored.56 Federal troops
stayed a few more years, but African-Americans were increasingly
subject to violent confrontation when they tried to vote or exercise
other civil rights.57 "The first efforts of the enfranchised [white]
citizens ... were to obliterate the Constitution foisted upon them
largely by renegades, carpetbaggers, and scalawags, and to re-
establish a free government."58 "Force and threat of force had put the
52. ALA. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1867), reprinted in 1 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 51, at 91.
53. See, e.g., MISs. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1868), reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 51, at 385 (declaring that
all male citizens could vote, subject to some qualifications).
54. See 1 U.S.C. LXIV-LXV (2000) (listing ratifications of Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments).
55. Act of June 22, 1868, ch. 69, 15 Stat. 72, 73 (readmitting Arkansas to
representation in Congress). The acts readmitting other states to representation were
virtually identical. See Act of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (Texas); Act of Feb. 23,
1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (Mississippi); Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63
(Virginia); Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73, 74 (North Carolina, South Carolina,
Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama and Florida).
56. See generally Daniel v. Hutcheson, 22 S.W. 933 (Tex. 1893) (discussing end of
Military Reconstruction).
57. See FONER, supra note 46, at 291.
58. Terrell v. Middleton, 187 S.W. 367, 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
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whites in power. Within 10 or 15 years after 1867 the premature
enfranchisement of the Negro was largely undone, and undone by
veritable revolution. '59 Fraud in addition to force was used, including
"[g]errymandering, trickery in election administration, [and] fraud in
casting and counting ballots."'
Beginning with Mississippi in 1890, the Southern states utilized
state constitutions to disenfranchise African-Americans more
efficiently and permanently, and with the patina of lawfulness. The
purpose was "to eliminate the supposed danger from the negro
vote. '61  "Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana invented the
principal techniques for voiding the Constitution by constitutional
means.... In 1890 Negroes made up more than 50 per cent of the
population of each of these states."62
The Mississippi Constitution of 1890 disqualified those convicted
of certain crimes, and required voters to pay a poll tax, pass a literacy
test and be able to read, understand and interpret the state
constitution.63 The South Carolina constitution of 1895 added a
property exception to the literacy test.64
In order to accomplish the goal of ensuring, as Louisiana's
Lieutenant Governor explained, "that every white man shall vote,
because he is white, and no black man shall vote, because he is
black, '65 the Louisiana Constitution of 1898 invented the grandfather
59. KEY, supra note 8, at 536.
60. Id. at 540; see also, e.g., Albert E. McKinley, Two New Southern Constitutions, 18
POL. SCI. Q. 480, 482 (1903) ("It was well recognized [in Alabama and Virginia] that the
existing practical disenfranchisement of the Negro by means of intimidation and dishonest
election methods must give place to a constitutional limitation upon Negro suffrage.").
61. DEALEY, supra note 12, at 90.
62. KEY, supra note 8, at 537.
63. MISS. CONST. art. XII (1890), reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 51, at 424-25. See generally William
Alexander Mabry, Disenfranchisement of the Negro in Mississippi, 4 J. S. HIST. 318 (1938)
(discussing the Mississippi constitutional convention).
64. S.C. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1895), reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 51, at 505.
65. Amasa M. Eaton, The Suffrage Clause in the New Constitution of Louisiana, 13
HARV. L. REV. 279, 281 (1899). Professor Eaton agreed with the Louisiana convention's
conclusion that African-American suffrage was a mistake, but that unconstitutional
disenfranchisement was not the appropriate response:
Let us freely admit that a great mistake was made in thus conferring the suffrage
upon them, but let us not lend ourselves to another and perhaps a still more
serious mistake by correcting this error by some ultra constitutional method. We
may rest assured that in the long run the cause of constitutional liberty is best
maintained by correcting errors only by the methods pointed out in the
Constitution.
Id. at 283; accord Dos Passos, supra note 7, at 476 ("The best friends of the negro, of
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clause, which "exempted [from educational and property tests]
persons entitled to vote on or before January 1, 1867, or the son or
grandson of such person. '66 Thus, the President of the Convention
explained, Louisiana's constitution undid "the greatest crime of the
nineteenth century, the placing of the ballot in the hands of the negro
race by the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States."'67
Even many defenders of the successful campaign to eliminate the
Reconstruction constitutions acknowledged the violence employed in
achieving the goal of disenfranchising African-Americans. 68  The
Mississippi Supreme Court described the process in much the same
way as did historian V.O. Key:
69
Our unhappy state had passed in rapid succession from civil war
through a period of military occupancy, followed by another, in
which the control of public affairs had passed to a recently
enfranchised race, unfitted by educational experience for the
responsibility thrust upon it. This was succeeded by a
semimilitary, semicivil uprising, under which the white race,
inferior in number, but superior in spirit, in governmental
instinct, and in intelligence, was restored to power. The
anomaly was then presented of a government whose distinctive
characteristic was that it rested upon the will of the majority,
being controlled and administered by a minority of those
entitled under its organic law to exercise the electoral
franchise.7 0
Accordingly, the constitutional convention took steps to legalize
the violent disenfranchisement of African-Americans:
Within the field of permissible action under the limitations
which I profess to be one, are forced to admit, nearly forty years after the War, that negro
suffrage in the South was a monumental error.").
66. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 373 (E.D. La. 1963) (three judge
court), affd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965). The clause was contained in Article 197 of the
Louisiana Constitution. See LA. CONST., art. 197 (1898) reprinted in 4A SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 51, at 256-58; see also
Eaton, supra note 65, at 285-88 (describing the drafting of Article 197 of the Louisiana
Constitution).
67. Eaton, supra note 65, at 299; see also United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at
368-69, 373 (discussing Louisiana's grandfather clause).
68. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 59-62.
70. Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 867 (Miss. 1896). See generally Gabriel J. Chin,
Rehabilitating Unconstitutional Statutes: An Analysis of Cotton v. Fordice, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 421, 424-33 (2002) (discussing the historical background of, and litigation over,
Section 241 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890).
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imposed by the federal constitution, the convention swept the
circle of expedients to obstruct the exercise of the franchise by
the negro race. By reason of its previous condition of servitude
and dependence, this race had acquired or accentuated certain
peculiarities of habit, of temperament, and of character, which
clearly distinguished it as a race from that of the whites,-a
patient, docile people, but careless, landless, and migratory
within narrow limits, without forethought, and its criminal
members given rather to furtive offenses than to the robust
crimes of the whites. Restrained by the federal constitution
from discriminating against the negro race, the convention
discriminated against its characteristics and the offenses to
which its weaker members were prone. A voter who should
move out of his election precinct, though only to an adjoining
farm, was declared ineligible until his new residence should
have continued for a year. Payment of taxes for two years at or
before a date fixed many months anterior to an election is
another requirement, and one well calculated to disqualify the
careless. Burglary, theft, arson, and obtaining money under
false pretenses were declared to be disqualifications, while
robbery and murder and other crimes in which violence was the
principal ingredient were not.71
Forty years later, the Mississippi Supreme Court looked back
with admiration to what it regarded as the good works of the
convention: "[T]hey enacted a Constitution that dissipated the clouds
of venality and corruption which overhung the South during the
reconstruction period, and the sunlight of peace, prosperity, and
happiness has blessed the land since that time.
' 72
In Hunter v. Underwood,73 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated
the disenfranchisement provision of the Alabama Constitution of
1901. The Court noted that testimony of historians
showed that the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901
was part of a movement that swept the post-Reconstruction
South to disenfranchise blacks.... The delegates to the all-
white convention were not secretive about their purpose. John
B. Knox, president of the convention, stated in his opening
address: "And what is it that we want to do? Why it is within
71. Ratliff, 20 So. at 868.
72. Hill v. Duckworth, 124 So. 641, 643 (Miss. 1929); see also United States v.
Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925, 985-87 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (three judge court) (Brown, J.,
dissenting) (describing the discriminatory purpose of the convention), rev'd, 380 U.S. 128
(1965).
73. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
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the limits imposed by the Federal Constitution, to establish
white supremacy in this State."74
The evidence of the background of constitutional change in
Louisiana is also unimpeachable. Edward White became Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court after service as a
Confederate officer.75 When he died, his friends on the Louisiana
Supreme Court recounted with pride his service in the White
League's76 coup d'etat against the Reconstruction government of
Louisiana.77
Over time, the purpose of the rules became a matter of open and
common knowledge. For example, in Yuratich v. Plaquemines Parish
Democratic Executive Committee,78 a white person who wished to
stand as a candidate in a party primary but could not satisfy the
property requirements argued that the constitutional provisions
allowing parties to establish qualifications for candidates were
"limited to such requirements as may be necessary to maintain White
Supremacy in Louisiana." 9 He lost because the Louisiana Court of
Appeals concluded that the power granted by the constitution "was
not limited to such qualifications as relate to race,' 80 acknowledging
that racial concerns were at least one motivating reason.
II. EQUALITY OF STATES
The overthrow of the Reconstruction governments in the South
was accomplished by methods contrary to the terms of the
Reconstruction Acts. However, there is a plausible argument that
74. Id. at 229 (quoting 1 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA, MAY 21ST, 1901 TO SEPTEMBER 3RD, 1901,
at 8 (1940)) (internal citations omitted). For full transcripts of the convention, see
OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
ALABAMA: MAY 21ST, 1901, TO SEPTEMBER 3RD, 1901, at
http://www.legislature.state.al.us/misc/history/constitutions/1901/proceedings
/1901_proceedings voll/1901.html; see also Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050,
1062-63 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (describing the Alabama convention); Ex parte Melof, 735 So. 2d
1172, 1181-83 (Ala, 1999) (providing portions of the convention transcripts).
75. Edward White: In Memoriam, 149 La. i, viii-xi (1922) [hereinafter White: In
Memoriam].
76. The White League was a white supremacist organization violently opposed to
Reconstruction. See United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 367-68 (E.D. La. 1963)
(three judge court), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
77. White: In Memoriam, supra note 75, at vii. Interestingly, Chief Justice White
authored the U.S. Supreme Court's unanimous opinion invalidating the grandfather
clause. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 365 (1915).
78. 32 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 1947).
79. Id. at 650.
80. Id. at 651.
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this statutory violation is irrelevant because the Reconstruction Acts
were themselves unconstitutional. Because they imposed the
fundamental condition that states grant a broad franchise only on
some states, it could be argued that the Reconstruction Acts violated
the well-established doctrine of "equality of states."
The "equality of states" doctrine holds that states must be
admitted to the Union on equal terms.81 If the Reconstruction Acts
are regarded as subject to this doctrine,82 it might be argued that they
are invalid because of the special conditions imposed on the Southern
states, which are not on an equal footing with the other states whose
electoral practices are unregulated.83
Yet, it seems obvious that all states need not be treated in
precisely the same way. Of course, as the text makes clear, states are
not protected by the Equal Protection Clause of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' The ordinary and apparently legal
behavior of the national government seems to allow differential
treatment. Time and again, Congress takes action benefiting some
states and disadvantaging others-Massachusetts's Air Force base is
closed while California's remains operational; Nevada gets a
radioactive waste dump while Kentucky gets a hospital-and
everyone understands that this is politics. Even in the context of
voting rights, the Supreme Court has held that all states need not be
subject to the same rules; the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of
1965 even though some of its provisions apply to some states and not
others.
81. 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 3.6 (3d ed. 1999).
82. Technically, the Reconstruction Acts restored the Southern states to
representation in Congress rather than readmitting them to the Union. In White v. Hart,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 652 (1871), the Court examined the language of the acts
readmitting the Southern states to representation in Congress on the one hand, and acts
admitting states to the Union on the other, and came to the following conclusion:
The different language employed in the two classes of cases evinces clearly that,
in the judgment of Congress, the reconstructed States had not been out of the
Union, and that to bring them back into full communion with the loyal States,
nothing was necessary but to permit them to restore their representation in
Congress ....
Id.
83. The supreme courts of Mississippi and Arkansas accepted this reasoning, as did
the decision underlying a summary affirmance by the United States Supreme Court,
although that summary decision has since been overruled. See supra notes 15-17.
84. The Fourteenth Amendment is, after all, a limitation on-rather than a grant of-
state authority. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state... shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
85. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966) ("The doctrine of
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So what then does "equality of states" require? In Coyle v.
Smith s6 the leading decision on equality of states, the Supreme Court
invalidated a provision in the act admitting Oklahoma to statehood
and designating a particular city as Oklahoma's capitol.87 The Court
recognized the "constitutional equality of the states,"8 explaining that
the federal power to admit states is the power to admit states "equal
in power, dignity and authority." 9
This language could be understood as meaning that states must
be admitted to the Union on identical terms-any unique or special
conditions are void. However, Coyle itself makes clear that this view
is wrong. Instead, the determinative issue is whether the special
condition is within the power of Congress. There is no hint that a
statute, which would otherwise be a valid exercise of federal power, is
unconstitutional because it comes in an act authorizing admission of a
new.state. The Court explained that state power cannot be limited
"by any conditions, compacts, or stipulations embraced in the act
under which the new State came into the Union, which would not be
valid and effectual if the subject of congressional legislation after
admission."9"
Later in the Coyle opinion, the Court explicitly stated that the
problem with Congress dictating the location of the state capitol was
the absence of federal power over state capitols at all, rather than that
Oklahoma in particular was being singled out or that the provision
was contained in a statute admitting a state into the Union:
It may well happen that Congress should embrace in an
enactment introducing a new State into the Union legislation
... which might be upheld as legislation within the sphere of the
plain power of Congress. But in every such case such
legislation... derive[s] its force not from any agreement or
compact with the proposed new state, nor by reason of its
acceptance of such enactment as a term of admission, but solely
because the power of Congress extended to the subject, and,
therefore, would not operate to restrict the State's legislative
power in respect of any matter which was not plainly within the
the equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that
doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to
the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.").
86. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
87. Id. at 580.
88. Id. at 580.
89. Id. at 567.
90. Id. at 573.
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regulating power of Congress.91
For obvious reasons, the flow of cases involving admission of
states to the Union has trickled off in recent decades. However, in
several cases decided after Coyle, the Court upheld special provisions
of enabling acts on the ground that, unlike the location of state
capitols, the provision was within federal power: "the principle of
equality is not disturbed by a legitimate exertion by the United States
of its constitutional power."' The question is whether the federal
government has the power to do a particular thing, not whether the
power is exercised in a statute admitting or readmitting a state to the
Union. In this context, the pertinent question is whether the federal
government had the power to regulate the Southern States'
readmission to representation in Congress. It is to this question that
the discussion now turns.
III. FEDERAL POWER
In its post-Civil War decisions, the Supreme Court was frank
about the legal status of those who supported the Confederacy:
individual Confederates were "traitors;"93 in the eyes of the law, they
were enemies:
[I]n the war of the rebellion the United States sustained the
double character of a belligerent and a sovereign, and had the
rights of both .... [When] a rebellion ... has become a
recognized war those who are engaged in it are to be regarded
as enemies. And they are not the less such because they are
also rebels.94
The Confederacy was "a treason respectable only for the
numbers and force by which it was supported."'95 Its existence was
illusory,
91. Id. at 574.
92. United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 365 (1933); see also Ex parte Webb, 225
U.S. 663, 691 (1912) (upholding statute under the Commerce Clause).
93. Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202,210 (1875).
94. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 307-09 (1870).
95. Sprott v. United States, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 459, 463 (1874); see also, e.g., Ford v.
Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 604-05 (1878) ("The district of the country declared by the constituted
authorities, during the late civil war, to be in insurrection... was enemy territory, and all
the people residing in it were ... liable to be treated... as enemies."); White v. Hart, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 650 (1871) ("The doctrine of secession is a doctrine of treason, and
practical secession is practical treason, seeking to give itself triumph by revolutionary
violence. The late rebellion was without any element of right or sanction of law.");
Mauran v. Ins. Co., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 1, 13 (1867) (noting that the Confederate
governments "were wholly null and void").
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except as a conspiracy to overthrow lawful authority. Its
foundation was treason against the existing Federal
government. Its single purpose, so long as it lasted, was to
make that treason successful.... Its existence and temporary
power were an enormous evil, which the whole force of the
government and the people of the United States was [sic]
engaged for years in destroying. When it was overthrown it
perished totally. It left no laws, no statutes, no decrees, no
authority which can give support to any contract, or any act
done in its service, or in aid of its purpose, or which contributed
to protract its existence.96
Thus, for example, although there was a statute of the
Confederate Congress creating the Confederate States' District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama, it did not exist in the eyes of
United States law.97 Accordingly, a person charged with treason
against the Confederacy during the war could bring a false
imprisonment action against a "judge" of the Confederate non-
court.98
However, the Supreme Court distinguished between benign acts
of seceding states on the one hand and the Confederacy they formed
on the other. The Confederacy had a primary purpose-separation
from the United States-while the individual states had legitimate
responsibilities for police, property, and family rights. The execution
of those duties would be recognized as valid "where they were not
hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of
the National government, and did not impair the rights of citizens
under the Constitution. '" 99 Thus, acts of the seceding states were
valid, if innocent, but those designed to help the Confederacy or
deprive loyal individuals of their rights were void.
The Confederacy has been sentimentalized in some quarters."°
96. Sprott, 87 U.S. at 464-65 (explaining that a claimant who purchased cotton from
the Confederacy, which was subsequently seized by the United States, had no claim).
97. Hickman v. Jones, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 197,201 (1869).
98. Id. at 200-01 (stating that because of the illegal nature of the southern states'
rebellion, the Confederate District Court was "a nullity, and could exercise no rightful
jurisdiction").
99. Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 570, 580 (1873) (holding that a trustee who
invested in Confederate bonds was liable to beneficiaries); see also Texas v. White, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 700, 733 (1868) (holding that otherwise valid acts of confederate governments
would be held valid, while "acts in furtherance or support of rebellion against the United
States, or intended to defeat the just rights of citizens," would be deemed null and void).
100. See, e.g., Erickson v. City of Topeka, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1147 (D. Kan. 2002)
(noting the potential positive connotations of the Confederate flag); Bosworth v. Harp,
157 S.W. 1084, 1088 (Ky. 1913) (upholding pensions granted to Confederate veterans by a
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However, whatever the underlying merits-or lack thereof-of the
Confederate view of constitutional law and the nature of human
rights, legally the rebel military campaign against the United States
had the same status as, say, the 1941 campaign of the Empire of
Japan: all of the war powers of the United States could be deployed
to suppress it. Under the Constitution, citizens who took up the
Confederate cause had no more rights than Americans like Herbert
Haupt 1°1 and Yaser Esam Hamdi.1° Thus, in describing the rights of
the United States in the captured city of New Orleans, the Court
explained:
[G]overnment had the same power and rights in territory held
by conquest as if the territory had belonged to a foreign country
and had been subjugated in a foreign war. In such cases the
conquering power has a right to displace the pre-existing
authority, and to assume to such extent as it may deem proper
the exercise by itself of all the powers and functions of
government.... It may do anything necessary to strengthen
itself and weaken the enemy. There is no limit to the powers
that may be exerted in such cases, save those which are found in
the laws and usages of war.103
The decision in Stewart v. Kahn1°4 is particularly instructive. In
Stewart, the Court upheld, under the war power, a federal statute
suspending the statute of limitations in state courts.1 5 In so holding,
the Court found that the measures to be taken in carrying on war and
to suppress insurrection are not precisely defined in the text of the
Constitution. The decision of all questions regarding the scope of the
powers to conduct war and suppress insurrection rests, therefore,
Union state). But see Trustees of North Carolina Endowment Fund v. Satchwell, 71 N.C.
86, 88 (1874) (voiding the charter given to a corporation that offered support to orphans of
Confederate soldiers), available at 1874 WL 2528. See generally TONY HOROWITZ,
CONFEDERATES IN THE ATric: DISPATCHES FROM THE UNFINISHED CIVIL WAR (1998)
(describing the continuing admiration of the Confederacy in the American South).
101. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 46 (1942) (holding that Herbert Haupt, whom the
Court assumed arguendo to be a naturalized citizen of the United States, could properly
be convicted by military commission for his participation in a sabotage plot sponsored by
the German Reich).
102. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 476 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that American
citizen Yaser Esam Hamdi, who had been "designated an enemy combatant ... captured
in an zone of active combat operations abroad," was not entitled to habeas relief on
grounds that "further judicial inquiry is unwarranted when the government has responded
to the petition by setting forth factual assertions which would establish a legally valid basis
for the petitioner's detention"), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004).
103. City of New Orleans v. The Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387,393-94 (1874).
104. 78 U.S. 439 (1870).
105. Id. at 507.
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wholly in the discretion of those in whom the Constitution vests the
substantial powers involved. Further, the Court reasoned, the power
to suppress insurrections is not limited to winning the battle; it
naturally includes the power to "guard against the immediate renewal
of the conflict, and to remedy the evils" which have arisen from its
progress.
106
Stewart v. Kahn is significant because it recognizes that the war
power does not terminate immediately upon cessation of hostilities;
the belligerent's rights include doing what is necessary to ensure that
"the evils" do not arise again. It is also significant because it is not a
political question case, holding that courts cannot interfere with
executive decisions. 7 Instead, the Court affirmatively enforced the
statute.
The contemporaneous decisions of the Supreme Court suggest
that the Reconstruction Acts were similarly constitutional. Southern
states challenged Military Reconstruction by filing bills of complaint
in the Supreme Court. In 1867, the Court dismissed Mississippi's suit,
holding that President Andrew Johnson's allegedly unconstitutional
actions taken pursuant to the Reconstruction Acts presented non-
justiciable political questions. 10 8 The next term, Georgia's suit against
the Secretary of War was dismissed on the same grounds.0 9
The following year, in 1869, the Court found a case presenting
facts permitting it to reach the constitutional status of military
reconstruction. That case, Texas v. White,"' involved the validity of
U.S. bearer bonds given to Texas in 1851 in settlement of a boundary
dispute. Texas disposed of the bonds during the war, and the new
Texas government sued the current holders of the bonds, claiming
that the secessionist government transferred them illegally.111 The
bondholders responded by arguing that "Texas" had no right to sue,
either because "Texas" ceased to be a state because of its secession,
or, at least, that the government imposed by the Reconstruction Acts
106. Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712, 714-15 (1875) (citing Stewart, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
at 506); see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 12 (1946) (noting that the laws of war apply
after cessation of hostilities and therefore jurisdiction of military commissions continues).
107. See generally 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 81, § 2.16 (stating that some
executive or congressional decisions are not subject to judicial review).
108. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 500-01 (1867).
109. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77-78 (1868); see also Boiling v. Lersner,
91 U.S. 594, 595 (1875) (declining to reach the question of the constitutionality of the
Reconstruction Acts because the question was not decided below).
110. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), overruled on other grounds by Morgan v. United
States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885).
111. Id.at704-06.
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had no authority to file suit."2 The Court rejected both claims."3
As to the contention that Texas had ceased to exist as a state, the
Court concluded that "[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to
an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.
' 114
Accordingly, the secession was "absolutely null."' 15 The evocative
phrase "indestructible States" has often been cited in support of
states' rights,"6 but its original usage was to underscore the state's
breach of its indestructible constitutional duties: "The obligations of
the State, as a member of the Union, and of every citizen of the State,
as a citizen of the United States, remained perfect and unimpaired."'' 7
The Court also held that the Reconstruction government had
authority to prosecute the suit on behalf of the State of Texas."8
While the Court did not "pronounce judgment upon the
constitutionality of any particular provision of these acts," '19 its
analysis, discussed at length below, almost inevitably leads to the
conclusion that the suffrage provision of the Reconstruction Act was
constitutional.
First, the Court stated that the rebel states could be excluded
from Congress for a period of time, and that therefore the "carrot" of
the Reconstruction Act, readmission of the Southern delegations, was
legitimately withheldY.20 Although Texas was still in the Union after
secession, that did not mean that the relationship between Texas and
the Union was unaffected by the state's illegal and revolutionary acts:
No one has been bold enough to contend that, while Texas was
controlled by a government hostile to the United States, and in
affiliation with a hostile confederation, waging war upon the
United States, senators chosen by her legislature, or
representatives elected by her citizens, were entitled to seats in
Congress .... All admit that, during this condition of civil war,
the rights of [Texas] as a member, and of her people as citizens
of the Union, were suspended. The government and the
citizens of the State, refusing to recognize their constitutional
112. Id. at 709-10.
113. Id. at 720-21.
114. Id. at 725.
115. Id. at 726.
116. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (" 'The
Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible States.' " (quoting White, 74 U.S. at 725)); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 457 (1991) (quoting same).
117. White, 74 U.S. at 726.
118. Id. at 732.
119. Id. at 731.
120. Id. at 730-31.
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obligations, assumed the character of enemies, and incurred the
consequences of rebellion. 2'
The Court explained that the United States had to defeat the
Confederacy, which it was authorized to do under the war power and
the power to suppress insurrection. Having achieved military victory,
the national government was not obligated immediately to walk away;
it could take steps to protect itself from people who had made
themselves enemies. The national government was entitled to
reestablish "the broken relations of the State with the Union."'22
According to the Court, this power arose from the federal
government's constitutional promise to ensure a republican form of
government for each and every state in the union.123 In order to fulfill
this obligation, the Court held, the national government must be able
to effectively exercise the power to suppress insurrection, which itself
was "a necessary complement"124 to the guarantee of a republican
form of government.
The Court explained that congressional exercise of the
Guarantee Clause power was valid if the means were "necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the power conferred." '125 The
Reconstruction Acts' suffrage provision protected the freed slaves by
imposing terms in the state constitutions. The Court held that both
the purpose and the method were within the scope of the Guarantee
126Clause. As to the freed slaves, the Court explained:
The new freemen necessarily became part of the people, and
the people still constituted the State .... And it was the State,
thus constituted, which was now entitled to the benefit of the
constitutional guarantee.'27
With respect to the state constitutions, the Court stated that new
state officials would have to be elected, and "before any such election
could be properly held, it was necessary that the old constitution
should receive such amendments as would conform its provisions to
121. Id. at 727.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 727-28. Here, the Court was referring to the "Guarantee Clause." See
supra note 38.
124. White, 74 U.S. at 727-28. See also Christian Feigenspan, Inc., v. Bodine, 264 F.
186, 194 (D.N.J. 1920) (noting that the Reconstruction Acts "were war measures, and
applicable solely to the states then or then recently in a state of rebellion"), affd sub nom.,
253 U.S. 350 (1920).
125. White, 74 U.S. at 729.
126. Id. at 730.
127. Id. at 728-29.
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the new conditions created by emancipation, and afford adequate
security to the people of the State.'
1 28
Texas v. White suggests that Congress could protect the freed
slaves by reforming the state constitutions under the Guarantee
Clause.'29 Analysis of whether granting suffrage to the freed slaves
was a necessary and proper means of carrying out the Guarantee
Clause turns on what the Guarantee Clause was designed to do. The
Supreme Court has generally held that enforcement of the
Republican Form of Government Clause presents a political question
and claims under it are "therefore not cognizable by the judicial
power, but solely committed by the Constitution to the judgment of
Congress."'30  Accordingly, the Court has only infrequently and
succinctly explored the substantive meaning of the Clause. What it
has said is fairly consistent: the Clause is designed to protect popular
sovereignty.'
In Luther v. Borden,32 one of the most important Guarantee
Clause cases, the Court was faced with a claim arising out of the
existence of rival governments in Rhode Island, each claiming
128. Id. at 729.
129. Military Reconstruction was textually justified as a method of establishing
republican governments. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, 428-30 (1868)
(military government imposed until loyal and republican state governments could be
legally established); Act of June 22, 1868, ch. 69, 15 Stat. 72, 72 (1869) (noting that
Arkansas has "framed and adopted a constitution of State government, which is
republican").
130. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133 (1912); see also Ohio ex
rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1930) ("As to the guaranty to
every state of a republican form of government ... it is well settled that the questions
arising under it are political, not judicial, in character, and thus are for the consideration of
the Congress and not the courts." (citations omitted)). But cf. New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (noting prior cases holding that the Guarantee Clause presented a
political question but stating "[w]e need not resolve this difficult question today").
131. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government:
Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
749, 749 (1994) ("The central pillar of Republican Government, I claim, is popular
sovereignty."); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1988) (arguing that a proper
conception of federalism, informed by the Guarantee Clause, fosters an environment that
"allows individuals to participate actively in governmental decisionmaking"); Catherine A.
Rogers & David L. Faigman, "And to the Republic for Which it Stands": Guaranteeing a
Republican Form of Government, 23 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 1057, 1067 (1996) ("The
language of the Guarantee Clause indicates its structural purpose."); Thomas C. Berg,
Comment, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial Review, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 208, 231 (1987) (stating that the clause guarantees "accountability of
government decision makers to the people" and that "government decisions be made
deliberatively and by reference to a public value, rather than by simply deferring to the
interests of powerful private groups").
132. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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legitimacy. The Court rejected the plaintiff's claim for improper
search of his home under martial law declared by the prevailing
government, because Congress had recognized the prevailing
government as legitimate.133  Nevertheless, the Court stated,
"Unquestionably a military government, established as the
permanent government of the State, would not be a republican
government, and it would be the duty of Congress to overthrow it."
'13
Military government or a similarly undemocratic form would be
unconstitutional because "the sovereignty in every State resides in the
people of the State, and ... they may alter and change their form of
government at their own pleasure."'35
One of the most extended discussions of the Guarantee Clause
can be found in Duncan v. McCall,'36 a habeas corpus case in which
the defendant argued that the Texas penal code had not been enacted
in accordance with the state constitution. The Court concluded that
the argument was committed to the state courts, in the absence of
extreme circumstances:
This is not the case of a system of laws attacked ... as the
product of revolution. By the Constitution, a republican form
of government is guaranteed to every state in the Union, and
the distinguishing feature of that form is the right of the people
to choose their own officers for governmental administration,
117and pass their own laws....
The Court noted that "[tihe state of Texas is in full possession of
its faculties as a member of the Union, and its legislative, executive,
and judicial departments are peacefully operating by the orderly and
settled methods prescribed by its fundamental law." '138
The Supreme Court has stated that political accountability is an
element of the republican form of government. In Downes v.
Bidwell,'39 the Court interpreted "republican government" under the
Guarantee Clause "according to the definition of Webster"'- as " 'a
government in which the supreme power resides in the whole body of
the people, and is exercised by representatives elected by them.'
133. Id. at 43-44.
134. Id. at 45.
135. Id. at 47.
136. 139 U.S. 449 (1891).
137. Id. at 461.
138. Id. at 462.
139. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
140. Id. at 279.
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In New York v. United States,"' the Court held that a statute granting
federal funds and the right to ship radioactive waste in interstate
commerce based on passage of certain state laws did not deprive
states of a republican form of government. 4 2 The Court determined
that whatever the states decided to do in response to those federal
incentives, "[t]he states thereby retain the ability to set their
legislative agendas; state government officials remain accountable to
the local electorate."' 43 In Taylor v. Beckham (No. 1),'" the Court
held that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with a disputed
gubernatorial election in Kentucky, even though the state legislature
resolved it in a way which might have deprived the rightful winner of
the seat. 145  Because the ordinary institutions of state government
were functioning, "[a]ny remedy beside that is to be found in the
august tribunal of the people, which is continually sitting, and over
whose judgments on the conduct of public functionaries the courts
exercise no control.'
1 46
It is no coincidence that disenfranchisement occurred first in
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana, jurisdictions with African-
American majorities. Throughout the South, white political demand
for disenfranchisement was "most acute ... in those counties and
cities with black majorities.' ' 47 Where African-Americans were small
minorities, disenfranchisement was unnecessary to render them
powerless. This phenomenon makes clear that the suffrage provision
of the Reconstruction Act was designed to protect government
accountability to the majority of the people, and thus seems entirely
consistent with the Guarantee Clause. African-Americans were
made part of the people of the United States. Congress could
reasonably conclude that it had to do something to protect African-
Americans from hostile white neighbors in the South.
According to some historians, in jurisdictions without universal
suffrage, the assumption was that disenfranchised groups were
141. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
142. Id. at 186.
143. Id. at 185; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 242 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he right to vote is inherent in the republican form of government
envisaged by Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution."); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S.
281, 288 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Free and honest elections are the very
foundation of our republican form of government."), overruled by Moore v. Ogilvie, 394
U.S. 814 (1969).
144. 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
145. Id. at 580.
146. Id.
147. KEY, supra note 8, at 540.
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virtually represented or were for some reason poor decisionmakers.1 48
Women and children are the classic examples of such groups. 149 But
the theory, at least, was that these groups were disenfranchised to
protect the integrity of the electoral process, not simply so that they
could be oppressed. Indeed, there can be no serious argument that
disenfranchised African-Americans were virtually represented by
whites.
Of course, many of the objectionable parts of the post-
Reconstruction constitutions in the South have been invalidated by
the courts,150 the Civil Rights Act of 1964,151 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.152 As a result of these judicial and legislative
developments, voting is no longer conditioned on paying poll taxes 53
or passing tests of literacy or constitutional interpretation.
15 4
Nevertheless, enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts in the suffrage
area would make at least two important changes in current law with
respect to disenfranchisement of persons convicted of crime. First, if
the Reconstruction Act applied, then disenfranchisement would be
treated as punishment in former Confederate states.1 55  Currently,
disenfranchisement of felons is treated as a mere civil disability.
15 6
148. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 986 (2002) (discussing
virtual representation of women before the 19th Amendment).
149. See James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account
and Critique, 71 B.U. L. REV. 1, 35 n.123 (1991) (discussing "virtual representation" in the
context of the American colonies and Parliament).
150. The Supreme Court struck down the "grandfather clause," designed to allow
whites to vote automatically while requiring African-Americans to satisfy onerous
procedures. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 277 (1939). It also invalidated the "white
primary," where only whites were allowed to participate in the purportedly "private"
Democratic primary. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664-66 (1944); United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 329 (1941).
151. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2000).
152. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000). The
reports of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights offer an overview of the conditions leading
to and resulting from the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE VOTING RIGHTS Acr (1984),
reprinted in GABRIEL J. CHIN & LORI WAGNER, UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS: REPORTS ON VOTING (forthcoming 2004).
153. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
154. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (upholding the Voting Rights
Act's suspension of literacy test).
155. Recall that the Acts provided that disenfranchisement could only be imposed as
"punishment" for crime. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[I]f the
defendant is informed of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure l1's] critical consequences, he
need be informed of no others-such as possible consequent civil disenfranchisement or
the like." (citing United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 937 (5th Cir. 1979))).
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The practical difference is that persons pleading guilty to crimes are
entitled to be informed of the resultant criminal punishments, but
they are not entitled to be informed of civil disabilities that might
result from their plea.157 Accordingly, under the Reconstruction Act,
individuals considering whether to plead guilty to a crime (and over
90% of convictions result from guilty pleas)158 would be entitled to be
fully informed that a guilty plea would result in a forfeiture of the
right to vote.
More fundamentally, the Reconstruction Acts limit the crimes
for which disenfranchisement can be imposed to common law
felonies-e.g., murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, robbery, rape,
sodomy, mayhem, and larceny. 15 9 If the Reconstruction Acts applied,
the group of people subjected to disenfranchisement would be
reduced; presumably, non-violent drug offenders would be among the
largest groups to benefit from such an application.
There are reasons to be suspicious of broad criminal
disenfranchisement rules in this context; the Mississippi Supreme
Court acknowledged that the 1890 Constitution's rules were drafted
to disenfranchise African-Americans: "Restrained by the federal
constitution from discriminating against the negro race, the
convention discriminated against its characteristics and the offenses
to which its weaker members were prone." 6 ' Of course, provisions
clearly based on racial animus can be struck down. 161 But racial
animus must be proved, and is not likely to be admitted by
discriminators who know if they tell the truth their efforts to
discriminate will fail. Accordingly, some statutes in fact motivated by
racial animus are likely to survive judicial challenges. In addition, the
inquiry itself is time consuming and costly. If the 39th Congress
intended to come up with a safeguard for African-American suffrage
that was cheap, effective, and difficult to manipulate, it found one in
157. See, e.g., id.
158. See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of
Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 698 (2002)
(stating that "more than ninety percent of convictions result from guilty pleas"); Ronald
Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 30 n.1
(2002) (stating that "guilty pleas accounted for 94% of felony convictions in 1998").
159. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 108 n.6 (1943) (citing WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW § 26 (12th ed.)).
160. Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 868 (Miss. 1896); see also WOODWARD, supra note 11,
at 56 ("Virginia's law adding petty larceny to the list of disqualifications was imitated
because of its effect on the Negro vote.").
161. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 225 (1985) (finding a statute that contained
voting restrictions to be unconstitutional on grounds that discriminatory intent was a
motivating factor in its enactment).
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the Reconstruction Acts.
CONCLUSION
The repudiation of the Reconstruction constitutions and their
suffrage provisions has been called a coup d'etat.162 The President of
the Mississippi Constitutional Convention of 1890 agreed: "There was
revolution. There is no manhood nor honesty in attempting to
disguise it. There was revolution.' 1 63 These are strong words, but
lesser ones would hardly fit. African-Americans were citizens and, by
virtue of the Reconstruction Acts, in lawful possession of the ballot.
Through fraud, force, and violence, they were deprived of the
"fundamental political right,.., preservative of all rights."'" 6  This
injustice was enshrined in law in the form of state constitutions made
in flagrant defiance of the fundamental condition of the
Reconstruction Act. The Alabama Constitution of 1901 and the
Mississippi Constitution of 1890 remain in force; the constitutions in
all of the former confederate states trace to instruments created by
force, fraud, and the unconstitutional disenfranchisement of African-
Americans.
162. KEY, supra note 8, at 553.
163. S.S. Calhoon, The Causes and Events That Led to the Calling of the Constitutional
Convention of 1890, 6 PUBS. MiSs. HIST. SOc'Y 105,109 (1902).
164. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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